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ABSTRACT
Indigenous peoples and settlers engaged in innumerable conflicts in the colonies of Vancouver 
Island and British Columbia between 1849 and 1871. The constant threat of violent 
Indigenous resistance to settler colonization in the Pacific Northwest — both real and imag-
ined — produced feelings of anxiety for settlers, especially state officials, that shaped colonial 
strategy and statecraft. To buttress colonial security, the nascent state partnered with Christian 
missionaries in the hope that missionaries could use education to cultivate the goodwill of 
Indigenous peoples and train them to accept colonization. The state’s support for early mis-
sionary schooling in colonial British Columbia is examined in the context of settler anxieties 
regarding three instances of Indigenous resistance: a Lekwungen convergence at Fort Victoria 
in 1851, the Puget Sound War of 1855–56, and the 1864 Tsilhqot'in War. In different ways, 
settler anxiety over these conflicts acted as a catalyst, prodding the state to support mission-
ary schooling as a financially expeditious way of trying to contain Indigenous resistance and 
safeguard colonial security.
RÉSUMÉ
Entre 1849 et 1871, les colonies de l’île de Vancouver et de la Colombie-Britannique 
sont le lieu d’innombrables conflits entre les peuples autochtones et les colons. La menace 
constante — réelle et imaginaire — d’une résistance violente des Autochtones à la colonisation 
dans le nord-ouest du Pacifique a engendré un sentiment d’anxiété chez les colons, et en parti-
culier chez les fonctionnaires de l’État, ce qui a façonné la stratégie et la gestion coloniale. Afin 
de renforcer la sécurité coloniale, l’État naissant s’est associé avec les missionnaires chrétiens 
dans l’espoir qu’ils utilisent l’éducation afin d’assurer la bienveillance des peuples autochtones 
et de les amener à accepter la colonisation. Cet article examine le soutien apporté par l’État 
aux premiers efforts d’enseignement missionnaire en Colombie-Britannique coloniale, dans 
le contexte des inquiétudes des colons par rapport à trois actes de résistance autochtone : un 
rassemblement Lekwungen au Fort Victoria en 1851, la guerre du Puget Sound de 1855–1856 
et la guerre des Tsilhqot'in de 1864. À maints égards, l’inquiétude des colons alimentée par 
ces conflits a agi comme un catalyseur, poussant l’État à soutenir l’enseignement missionnaire 
dans l’espoir d’arriver à contenir la résistance autochtone et à assurer la sécurité coloniale à peu 
de frais.
On October 31, 1851, Governor James Douglas wrote to the British colonial sec-
retary in London to assure him of the Colony of Vancouver Island’s safety. Douglas 
noted with pride that nothing had occurred to “disturb the tranquility” of the island’s 
settlements since the colony’s founding in 1849.2 The governor’s sanguine assess-
ment, however, masked his concern for the security of the far-flung colony, par-
ticularly his growing anxiety about conflict with local Indigenous peoples.3 Indeed, 
Douglas later reasoned that “probably the worst calamity that can befall this colony 
in its infant state is the hostility of the Native Tribes,” and he described Indigenous-
settler relations in the Pacific Northwest as “a smouldering volcano, which at any mo-
ment may burst into fatal activity.”4 At mid-century, more than 30,000 Indigenous 
people surrounded a handful of European settlers, mostly clustered around the col-
ony’s capital of Victoria.5 Given the great population imbalance and the fact that 
some Indigenous groups had been supplied with firearms, Douglas was worried that 
increased colonization could — as was the case in other parts of the British Empire at 
mid-century — spark violent Indigenous resistance and jeopardize the colony’s exis-
tence.6 While the Colonial Office approved the use of British gunboats to patrol the 
bays and inlets of the Northwest Coast, it refused to dispatch troops to defend the 
colony against possible attacks from Indigenous inhabitants.7 Lacking the funds to 
support a military force, Douglas deemed it economically and strategically necessary 
to “cultivate [the] good will” of Indigenous peoples, and so he sought the secretary’s 
advice on how best to manage the population.8
One of the means that Douglas considered for cultivating Indigenous peoples’ 
cordiality was education. He informed the colonial secretary, “I am led to regret that 
the Missionary Societies of Britain, who are sending Teachers to so many other parts 
of the world have not yet turned their attention to the natives of Vancouvers [sic] 
Island.”9 To rectify the situation, Douglas suggested that if religious societies could 
send out missionary agents, “schools might be established for the moral training and 
instruction of the Aborigines, to the manifest advantage of the Colony.”10 Starting in 
the 1850s, the British state supported the creation of common schools to train set-
tler children to become better British subjects and to assist with colonization, and so 
it was thought that missionary schooling could also be used to win over Indigenous 
peoples to the ways of Europeans to discourage their organized resistance and, in the 
process, safeguard colonial power.11 Based on similar educational experiments among 
Indigenous peoples in other British colonies, the Colonial Office saw promise in the 
governor’s proposal and approached Christian missionary societies in London about 
sending out agents to the Pacific Northwest.12
This article examines the relationship between settler anxiety, specifically the 
fears of colonial officials, over conflict with Indigenous peoples — both real and 
imagined — and the state’s early support for missionary schooling in the colonies of 
Vancouver Island and British Columbia between 1849 and 1871. Historians have 
highlighted the connection between church and state and colonization in Canada; 
however, most scholars have suggested that this partnership developed later in the 
nineteenth century on the west coast.13 As such, historians argue that missionaries in 
what is now known as British Columbia “worked within a framework of governmental 
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coercion,” but this article demonstrates that, in part to assuage settler anxiety, the 
nascent colonial state called upon missionaries and assisted their educational efforts 
to help establish that very framework.14 Buttressing colonial security, then, and not 
benevolence or a deep sense of religious devotion, was the state’s main objective in 
initially aiding missionaries.15 Officially, the governments of Vancouver Island and 
British Columbia refused to provide religious bodies with financial aid to avoid de-
nominational disputes and allegations of favouritism, but unofficially the colonial 
state invited, directed, and supported early missionary schooling in hopes of cultivat-
ing the goodwill of Indigenous inhabitants and strengthening colonial security.
To understand how settler anxiety shaped state support for missionary school-
ing, this article draws on literature examining the role of emotion and empire.16 
Scholars such as Ann Laura Stoler argue that colonial records often reflect fears and 
anxieties, not just about what happened, but also about what was feared could hap-
pen.17 Drawing on such literature, this article examines the relationship between 
the expressed anxiety of colonial officials and their decisions to support missionary 
schooling in the context of three conflicts in the Pacific Northwest: a Lekwungen 
(Songhees) convergence at Fort Victoria in 1851, the Puget Sound War of 1855–56, 
and the 1864 Tsilhqot'in (Chilcotin) War. The article argues that anxiety over these 
conflicts acted as a catalyst, prodding the state to selectively support early missionary 
schooling as a financially expedient way of trying to contain Indigenous resistance 
and safeguard colonial security.
First in the Field
In 1829, Jonathan Green, a representative of the American Board of Commissioners 
for Foreign Missions, visited several Indigenous communities on the Northwest 
Coast and called for increased missionary attention to be paid to the area. One of the 
first to answer the call was Father Honoré Timothy Lempfrit, a Catholic priest who 
arrived on Vancouver Island in 1849. Lempfrit quickly started teaching Hudson’s 
Bay Company (HBC) servants, the Indigenous wives of fur traders, and interested 
children from a Lekwungen settlement located directly across from Fort Victoria. 
The HBC, which Britain had granted a ten-year lease over Vancouver Island, initially 
provided Lempfrit with a makeshift building to begin his work, and afterwards he 
erected a house in Victoria that he used as a classroom and chapel to teach upwards 
of twenty-five pupils.
The HBC gave Lempfrit moral support but no financial aid. He relied on do-
nations from his parishioners. Lempfrit laboured in the colony for two years, and 
according to Rear Admiral Fairfax Moresby, he was a “very intelligent & earnest mis-
sionary” who was generally “on good terms with the community.”18 Yet, Lempfrit’s 
relations with the Lekwungen soon soured. In July 1851, only three months before 
Douglas wrote to the colonial secretary to assure him of the colony’s safety, Moresby 
stated, “the good Padre [became] the cause of anxiety to the settlement, through a 
misunderstanding with the Indians, when the tribe assembled round the fort in a 
threatening manner.”19 While little is known about the convergence, it is clear that 
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in the eyes of some settlers, Lempfrit’s activities among the Lekwungen made him a 
liability to colonial security.
Figure 2: Governor James Douglas. Photograph 
courtesy of Royal BC Museum, A-01227.
Figure 1: Bastion at Fort Victoria, circa 1850s. Photograph courtesy of Royal BC Museum, A-00903.
In the wake of the incident, Governor 
Douglas asked Lempfrit to abandon his mis-
sion in Victoria. At the request, Lempfrit trav-
elled northwest to live among the Kw'amutsun 
(Cowichan), who were rumoured to be war-
like among the settlers. According to Douglas, 
this was a tactical error. He explained to the 
colonial secretary that Lempfrit left Victoria 
without “a single white assistant, and without 
any pecuniary means to defray the expense of 
an establishment, as he trusted entirely to his 
Indian converts for support; a plan that could 
hardly be expected to succeed…”20 Without 
colonial assistance, Lempfrit’s new mission 
did not last. In 1852, Douglas wrote to 
inform the colonial secretary that “we were… 
lately alarmed by a reported outrage com-
mitted by a party of Cowegins” on Lempfrit. 
In response, the governor “immediately dis-
patched an officer and a small force, with 
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orders to bring Mr. Lempfrit” back to Victoria.21 Lempfrit’s labours in the colony 
were doing more harm than good.
In light of Lempfrit’s activities, Douglas initially intended to prevent missionaries 
from working among Indigenous peoples in the colony.22 Given Vancouver Island’s 
small population and limited resources, Douglas thought that “it would be a mere 
waste of energy” to send missionaries to other parts of the island without any formal 
support.23 Officially, the state did not aid religious bodies so as to avoid denomi-
national disputes and allegations of favouritism. Yet Douglas also believed that en-
couraging further missionary work among Indigenous peoples would only expose 
religious agents to danger that would risk sparking “Indian difficulties” and draw 
the fragile and unprepared colony “into the contest.”24 By discouraging missionaries 
from overreaching, Douglas felt that he was following “the only safe course, by taking 
every possible precaution, to prevent the occurrence of difficulties.”25 Many settlers 
resented Douglas’s conciliatory approach to relations with Indigenous peoples, which 
some disparagingly termed a “squawtocracy.”26
The Puget Sound War, Settler Anxiety, and the Making of Metlakatla
Douglas’s diplomatic approach, and the prospects for missionary work, began to shift 
in the fall of 1855, when news reached Victoria of the outbreak of the Puget Sound 
War, an armed struggle over land rights between Indigenous peoples (Nisqually, 
Muckleshoot, Puyallup, and Klickitat) and colonizers in Washington Territory. 
Douglas’s feared “Indian difficulties” in the Pacific Northwest had become reality.27 
James Tilton, the acting governor of Washington Territory, wrote to Douglas ex-
plaining that the conflict was a “determined combination among the various Tribes 
to make war upon us.”28 He asked for help in waging war on Indigenous peoples, 
and Douglas answered the call: “I most cordially acknowledge the moral obligation 
which binds Christian and Civilized nations to exert their utmost power and influ-
ence in checking the inroads of the merciless savage; and it is a cause of sincere regret 
that our means of sending you assistance comes infinitely short of our wishes.”29 
While lacking supplies, Douglas purchased fifty stand of arms, secured ten barrels of 
gunpowder, and a supply of ball that he immediately sent on the Traveller. 30 Extra 
ammunition was sent on the Beaver. The steamship stayed on to patrol Puget Sound. 
Douglas hoped that the “moral effect” of the ship’s visit “will be powerfully felt by the 
Native Indian Tribes, and may contribute in some measure to confirm their wavering 
allegiance and to detach them from the general Indian confederacy.”31 These actions 
were in keeping with Douglas’s early “Indian policy,” which historian Barry Gough 
argues was “essentially crisis management.”32
Douglas monitored the war to the south closely. He wrote to the colonial secretary 
and expressed hope that the Indigenous groups would “receive a timely check, or the 
evil spirit may spread among the aboriginal population of the British Territory.”33 He 
clarified that in the case of the latter, the colony “would have to bear the brunt of an 
Indian war, which I trust a kind Providence may avert.”34 While Douglas explained 
that Indigenous peoples in the colony remained “quiet and friendly,” he remarked 
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that nevertheless they were “powerfully moved in favour of their race, a feeling which 
may exercise a mischievous influence on their excitable minds.”35 Douglas was anx-
ious. He lamented that the colony could not afford to play an active role in suppress-
ing southern hostilities but hoped that the Indigenous peoples would “soon be made 
to yield to the palm of victory.”36 By year’s end, it appeared that Vancouver Island 
would be spared from the spread of hostilities.
A few months later, however, Isaac Stevens, the governor of Washington Territory, 
wrote to Douglas with troubling news. Stevens relayed information about a plan by 
“Northern Indians” to attack various southern settlements.37 Rumours of possible 
attacks by “hostile” northern groups alarmed settlers.38 In March 1856, Douglas re-
ceived a petition by a “deputation of the most respectable inhabitants of the Colony” 
asking for a ship to be sent to Victoria.39 Anxiety was growing in the colony. The 
petition read:
May it please your Excellency we the undersigned inhabitants of Vancouvers’ 
[sic] Island beg most respectfully to call your most gracious attention to the 
Indian war that is now raging on the American shores within a few miles of 
our own homes. From the most recent accounts the attacks of the Indians 
have been most frightful and daring atrocities have been committed on the 
persons of women and children. We are aware that a large number of Indians 
are on their passage here from the north and it is impossible for any person to 
calculate to what extent they may be influenced by the accounts. They must 
undoubtedly hear from the neighbouring Indians. Under these circumstances 
and from a knowledge that we have no efficient force on the Island and cannot 
possibly organize such a force for some considerable time if at all, we deem it 
an imperative duty [… to ask] that one of Her Majesty’s ships should be sent 
here for our protection.40
Considering the gravity of the situation, the Colonial Office asked the Admiralty to 
order the President frigate to report to Vancouver Island. Douglas, too, feared the pros-
pect of northern Indigenous groups joining the fray: “[Recent] events prove how for-
midable an enemy the Indian may become and react powerfully on the minds of the 
natives within the British Territory who naturally feel elated at the courage and success 
of the colored races.”41 While the dreaded northern delegation failed to materialize, 
the Puget Sound War generally, and the fear of northern groups joining forces with 
those in the south to attack colonists, proved to be a catalyst for change in the colony.
Vancouver Island newspapers in the 1850s and 1860s reflected the growing anxi-
ety about potential conflict with Indigenous peoples and urged state officials to take 
immediate action. The Press stated: “we are all the time living over a mine that may 
at any instant explode and cause the most serious consequences”; and the Evening 
Express reported: “we are slumbering unconsciously on the edge of a volcano, which 
sooner or later will break out into an explosion of bloodshed and flame from one 
end of the Island to the other.”42 In the context of continued anxiety, colonial offi-
cials devised new means to manage the Indigenous population. Douglas revisited the 
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subject of missionary schooling and he informed the Colonial Office that he would 
now “render every assistance in my power” to assist religious agents.43 Douglas saw 
a role for missionaries to play in using education to neutralize Indigenous peoples’ 
resistance by training them to accept colonization and adapt to European culture, 
society, and economy.
In contrast to his views of the early 1850s, Douglas now proclaimed that mission-
aries would find “an extensive field open to missionary enterprise” in British territory, 
which also included the new mainland colony of British Columbia founded in 1858 
as a result of settlers’ discovery of gold.44 The two most active religious denomina-
tions in the area — Anglicans and Catholics — carved out separate spheres of spiritual 
influence in the region, or what historian Lynn A. Blake calls “denominational ge-
ographies.”45 Anglicans divided mostly into two groups — those sent by the Society 
for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) and those by the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS) — and took over the Northwest Coast and Fraser Canyon. 
Secular Catholics were active in Vancouver Island and the missionary Oblates of 
Mary Immaculate dominated the mainland colony of British Columbia, especially 
the Interior and the lower Fraser valley. Despite their denominational differences, 
Christian missionaries together started an assault on Indigenous lifeways that was 
encouraged and assisted directly by the state. While many Indigenous groups resisted 
and negotiated the arrival of missionaries as active political agents, missionaries nev-
ertheless helped facilitate a gradual shift in the Pacific Northwest’s balance of power 
away from Indigenous peoples in favour of settlers.46
In 1856, as the Puget Sound War wound down, the CMS sent out lay missionary 
William Duncan as the society’s first agent to the British Pacific Northwest. Duncan 
quickly became the most acclaimed missionary in the field.47 After working briefly in 
Victoria, Duncan set sail for the Northwest Coast, arriving at Fort Simpson to work 
among the Ts'msyan (Tsimshian) on October 1, 1857. He quickly learned to speak 
Sm’algyax from hereditary chief and HBC employee Arthur Wellington Clah, and 
his mastery of the local language supported his early efforts at conversion.48 To spread 
his influence, Duncan also established a school at Fort Simpson. In the summer of 
1858, a new school was built outside the fort walls and Duncan began teaching there 
in November 1859. The students were taught a variety of subjects, including reading, 
writing, and singing, in addition to religious teachings. Mission schools like Duncan’s 
were important institutions of acculturation in colonial British Columbia that gave 
missionaries daily access to Indigenous peoples to try to transform their traditional 
ways of life.
Duncan’s early success, though, was not restricted to Fort Simpson. Many of his 
students travelled south to trade in Victoria where they, with their respectable behav-
iour, caught the attention of the governor. In early 1860, Douglas recruited a trusted 
advisor and public school official, Rev. Edward Cridge, to write to Duncan about his 
successful mission. On January 4, 1860, Cridge wrote Duncan to inform him that 
the governor wished to “express to you the great gratification he has received from 
conversing with several of the Indians who have been under your instruction at Fort 
Simpson, and who are now at Victoria, and his please [sic] at witnessing the great 
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improvement of manners, learning and religion, which you have succeeded in effect-
ing in their condition.”49 In the context of fears about northern Indigenous groups 
joining the Puget Sound War, Douglas was interested in learning about how the lay 
cleric’s “civilizing” methods could be used to prevent future hostilities. Duncan’s la-
bours were paying off. In the spring, Douglas even invited the missionary to Victoria 
to consult him on what might be done to ease settler anxiety and ameliorate the 
conditions of local Indigenous peoples.
Duncan seized this relationship with the governor to emphasize the good effects of 
his teachings. While he spoke enthusiastically of the school at Fort Simpson, Duncan 
desired an independent missionary settlement away from the distractions of fort life 
and its poor hygienic conditions, which were thought to contribute to the spread of 
devastating diseases such as smallpox. He wrote Cridge, as the intermediary, to ask 
the governor for support to establish a separate community. Duncan believed strongly 
that promising converts, especially the “rising generation,” must be “removed from 
the evil influence” of Fort Simpson; he felt a “growing anxiety for a safe retreat.”50
Douglas thought highly enough of Duncan and his educational work to propose 
the idea of a missionary settlement to the Colonial Office. The governor wrote to 
the colonial secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, to ask for imperial sanction to “reserve 
several hundred acres of land” to “enable Mr. Duncan to carry this useful and benevo-
lent plan with effort.”51 The Colonial Office approved: “It would be a bright future 
in British Colonization; and an example to the United States if we can succeed in 
converting to Christianity and introducing to civilization the native inhabitants, or 
any portion of them, of British Columbia. To grant a reserve of land as a missionary 
settlement for converts seems to me a very proper and justifiable proceeding…”52 
Duncan had successfully secured a free grant of land for his educational purposes.53
Duncan’s plan for establishing a permanent Protestant missionary settlement on 
the Northwest Coast was approved by the Colonial Office and colonial regime as 
early as the summer of 1860; however, it would be two years before he attempted a 
move from Fort Simpson. To relocate his followers, Duncan required financial back-
ing and, once again, he turned to Cridge to broach the subject of pecuniary assis-
tance to Douglas, who was now the governor of both Vancouver Island and British 
Columbia. In April 1862, Duncan wrote to Cridge regarding the move: “The need 
of this step is becoming more and more urgent as miners are already rushing up here 
after gold and I have an idea that many of them will make this place their winter 
quarters and hence will spring up a serious train of evils.”54 Separation from Fort 
Simpson was the key, “I can then take a child or two from each of the surrounding 
tribes under my care and I have a hope of sending them back to teach in their own 
people; but this I cannot do at Fort Simpson. Parents have frequently told me that 
they feel afraid to have their children in this heathen camp, but will have no fear of 
their being with me under this new arrangement.”55 On the subject of money for his 
educational efforts, Duncan wrote to Cridge:
When I was last in Victoria I had a long conversation with his Excellency the 
Governor which turned principally on this subject viz. promoting industry 
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among the Indians at their own homes. He assured me that the government 
would render what assistance they could to promote so considerable [sic] 
work. Hence I thought of writing to him and begging some government aid… 
Will you kindly take the favourable opportunity of mentioning the matter to 
him?”56
Further progress on the Northwest Coast necessitated financial support from the 
colonial state. In the wake of the Puget Sound War, and continued settler anxiety 
about conflict with Indigenous peoples and raids from northern groups, aiding mis-
sionary education seemed a reasonable course of action.57 Cridge wrote to Duncan 
on June 21, 1862, informing him that he was to receive a grant of £50 to aid the 
creation of his settlement. This transaction is confirmed by a letter from March 
6, 1863, in which Duncan thanked the governor for assistance, “The Tsimshean 
Indians who have [been] lately removed from Fort Simpson under my supervision 
and settled here are very anxious to tender your Excellency their warmest thanks 
for the very liberal and timely aid, which you have rendered them, in building their 
new village.”58 The foundation for a new missionary settlement on the Northwest 
Coast was laid with state support in the form of a free grant of land and the sum 
of £50.
Crucial to Duncan’s state-supported missionary experiment was the continua-
tion of his school. He wrote to Douglas after the move to Metlakatla, “We have 
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Figure 3: Metlakatla, circa 1860s. William Duncan used St. Paul’s Church (centre) as the settlement’s first 
school. Photograph courtesy of Royal BC Museum, B-03571.
succeeded in erecting a strong and useful building capable of containing at least 600 
souls which we use as Church and School.”59 Duncan quickly turned his attention 
to education. He explained in a letter, “I have about 100 children who attend morn-
ing and afternoon and about 100 adults (often more) in the evening. I occupy the 
principal part of the time with the latter in giving them lectures on the following sub-
jects — Geography, astronomy, natural history, or morals — these lectures they seem 
greatly to prize.”60 Thus, in the late 1850s and early 1860s, the colonial state took an 
active interest in supporting missionary educational work as a financially expedient 
way of trying to check Indigenous peoples’ power and, in the process, strengthen 
colonial security.
The Tsilhqot'in War and State Support for St. Mary’s
While Douglas supported Protestant missionaries like Duncan in an effort to “civilize” 
and contain the threat of feared hostilities with northern groups, the state also sup-
ported Catholic missionaries to help stabilize relations between settlers and Indigenous 
peoples in the southern areas of Vancouver Island and British Columbia. After the 
unsuccessful work done among Indigenous peoples by Catholic agents like Lempfrit 
in the early 1850s, Bishop Demers invited the Oblates of Mary Immaculate, the most 
active missionaries in the field, to Vancouver Island. Overall, Catholics made the most 
advances in missionary schooling during the colonial period and received substantial 
encouragement and financial support from the state. This is especially significant con-
sidering that many colonial officials, including 
Douglas, were Protestants.
In the summer of 1858, conflict between 
the Nlha7kápmx (Thompson) and invad-
ing gold miners broke out in the new colony 
of British Columbia, and in 1859 Oblate 
missionaries shifted their activities from 
Vancouver Island to the mainland colony in 
hopes of diffusing tensions with their preach-
ings and teachings.61 In 1860, Fathers Léon 
Fouquet and Charles Grandidier, along with 
Brothers Georges Blanchet and Gaspard 
Janin, laid the foundation for a mission at 
New Westminster, British Columbia’s capi-
tal. From this base, the Oblates travelled in-
land, going as far as the mining communities 
of Fort Hope and Fort Yale. Fouquet started 
exploring options for another mission for 
Indigenous peoples away from the influences 
of whites. In 1861, he established St. Mary’s 
Mission near the mouth of the Harrison River, 
known today as Mission, which was midway 
Figure 4: Father Léon Fouquet. Photograph 
courtesy of Royal BC Museum, I-51542.
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between New Westminster and Fort Hope. The site on the north bank of the Fraser 
River was selected strategically because it allowed a variety of Indigenous groups 
from the Interior and the Fraser valley to travel to the mission by water. In 1863, 
an industrial school for Indigenous boys was started. Like Duncan’s Metlakatla, St. 
Mary’s would become one of the most successful missions in the Pacific Northwest 
thanks, in part, to support from the colonial state.
The colonial government, though, did not take immediate interest in St. Mary’s. 
Fouquet wrote to Douglas on April 11, 1864, informing him of the Oblates’ ac-
tions and requesting aid to support the institution, specifically for the purposes of 
education:
That the mission of St. Mary’s, to which your memorialist belongs has already 
an educational and industrial school at the Lower Fraser, where there are at 
present forty two boys of the aboriginal tribes, supported and provided for 
by the Mission, and taught the usual branches of common education, viz. 
Reading, writing, arithmetic… and arrangements have been made for estab-
lishing a school for girls…
For consideration of the foregoing mentioned exertions for the amelioration 
and improvement of the aborigines, your memorialist respectfully requests that 
some portion of the money appropriated by the Legislature for educational 
purposes, may be granted to St. Mary’s Mission.62
Yet, with the school already operating at capacity, and the state’s policy of refusing aid 
to religious bodies, the cash-strapped colony of British Columbia had little incentive 
to offer aid to St. Mary’s. Douglas, who at the time was governor of both Vancouver 
Island and British Columbia, appears not to have responded to Fouquet’s request. As 
had been the case in the Puget Sound War, however, violent Indigenous resistance to 
colonization in the spring of 1864 caused a great deal of settler anxiety and proved to 
be an impetus for change.
When Frederick Seymour took over from Douglas as governor of British 
Columbia in the spring of 1864, he was eager to continue to cultivate the goodwill 
of the Indigenous population. Yet, in late April 1864, just weeks after Fouquet made 
his request to Douglas for support, Tsilhqot'in warriors waged war on whites in the 
area of Bute Inlet, killing nineteen men. A wagon road was being built through 
Tsilhqot'in territory to connect up with the Cariboo Road on the way to Barkerville 
and the British Columbia goldfields. As road construction continued to Bute Inlet, 
a group of Tsilhqot'in attacked the construction crew and then moved farther north, 
killing foreman William Brewster and three others, as well as William Manning, a 
settler at Puntzi Lake. The Tsilhqot'in generally resented the unauthorized intru-
sion of whites into their territory, and warriors sought to exact revenge for certain 
abuses, including the spread of smallpox to the Interior.63 When news of the resis-
tance reached Seymour, who had only been governor for a month, he took immediate 
action to capture the warriors. Under false pretences of amnesty, eight Tsilhqot'in 
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men were arrested and five — Klatsassin, Piell, Tellot, Tahpit, and Chessus — were 
charged with murder.64 While Klatsassin protested that the killings were acts of war 
and not murder, Supreme Court Judge Matthew Baillie Begbie sentenced all five 
men to death by hanging. The colonial state, fearful of an organized mass uprising, 
wanted to send a message to all Indigenous peoples that violence against white set-
tlers would not be tolerated. Such actions, though, were not without cost. The entire 
proceedings drained upwards of approximately $80,000 from already cash-strapped 
colonial coffers.
Despite Seymour’s swift action, “rumours” of an imminent “general insurrection” 
of Indigenous peoples circulated throughout British Columbia.65 In an attempt to 
cultivate goodwill and avoid further costly conflicts, Seymour held the first of many 
successive gatherings of Indigenous groups at New Westminster to celebrate Queen 
Victoria’s birthday in May 1864. At such a turbulent time, Seymour was conscious of 
the esteem with which many Indigenous peoples had held Douglas, and he wanted 
to counteract the impression that “their protector was withdrawn and would have no 
successor.”66 Seymour created the ad hoc summit and invited groups from around the 
colony to attend as a show of power and to prove that he had “succeeded to all the 
power of my predecessor and to his solicitude for their welfare.”67 At the gathering, 
Seymour announced:
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Figure 5: Klatsassin. Sketch from R. C. Lundin 
Brown, Klatsassin and Other Reminiscences of 
Missionary Life in British Columbia.
Figure 6: Governor Frederick Seymour. Photograph 
courtesy of Royal BC Museum, A-01752.
I am glad to see you and to find that so many have come down to show their 
loyalty to our Queen. You are right. The Queen has a good heart for the good 
Indians. I shall be good to them but harsh and severe to the bad ones. I will 
punish them as they deserve…
I am glad that you wish to be civilized and raised to an equality with the white 
man. Cultivate your lands, send your children to school, listen to what the 
clergymen tell you and believe in it.68
Seymour saw sagacity in Douglas’s strategy of trying to contain Indigenous peoples 
by cultivating their goodwill, and he identified missionary schooling as an important 
tool.
In the aftermath of the Tsilhqot'in War, Seymour took a great interest in mission-
ary work, especially the nearby St. Mary’s school. In the spring of 1865, he travelled 
up the Fraser River to St. Mary’s to investigate the facility. Upon his return to New 
Westminster, the governor wrote to the colonial secretary in London, offering a rare 
look at the conditions of one of the first industrial schools for Indigenous children 
in western Canada.69 In his report, Seymour commented on the forty-eight pupils in 
attendance: “Their ages ranged from eight to fourteen years. Their fine healthy ap-
pearance and good clothing at once satisfied me, that in this institution at least the 
native race was not weakening and dwindling by contact with Europeans. Indeed the 
pupils appeared more robust and active than the boys of their age whom I had seen 
in the forests and their cheerful faces presented an agreeable contrast to the worn and 
anxious countenances of the seniors who came to be present at the inspection.”70 In 
terms of the school’s amenities, Seymour stated, “The school room was large, clean 
and well ventilated. It had been decorated with flags, boughs, and ribbons by the 
boys.”71 Concerning pedagogy, Seymour observed: “I found them on examination to 
have made very considerable progress in arithmetic, geography, and spelling. Some of 
the handwriting was extremely good. The priests have almost entirely thrown aside 
the inconvenient Chinook medium and teach the boys in English. Even better than 
the writing was the singing.”72 The pupils at St. Mary’s established themselves as ex-
cellent musicians, specifically as singers. Seymour remarked, “I have not heard in any 
school with which I have officially come into contact, here or elsewhere, any piece of 
music so well delivered as was one Catholic hymn by these Indian boys.”73 Overall, 
Seymour’s visit convinced him that “the native race can thrive and improve under 
civilised habits. Mind and body seemed to have expanded together, and the cultiva-
tion of the brain, if one could judge by the demeanor of the students towards their 
preceptors, to have improved the impulses of the heart.”74
Seymour was so impressed with the St. Mary’s boys that he invited them to the 
second summit of Indigenous groups at New Westminster in 1865. In recounting 
the events, Seymour explained: “It rained heavily on the morning of the 24th of 
May, but a procession was formed of nearly one thousand canoes, extending from 
one bank of the Fraser to the other. Each boat had its flag and the more civilised 
of the natives sang a Catholic hymn, which had a very fine effect proceeding from 
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thousands of voices upon the water.”75 As part of the spectacle, “God Save the Queen 
was sung by the Indian boys of St. Mary’s Mission, and the Indians generally cheered 
vociferously.”76 Seymour also remarked, “It was generally observed that the Indians 
had made considerable progress in civilization and wellbeing since I first met them 
on the 24th May 1864. It was obvious that they were better dressed, and nothing 
could be greater than the respect with which they treated the constituted authorities 
of the Colony.”77 As a result, he suggested, “I allow myself to hope that the native 
conflicts will soon cease throughout the wide extent of the colony, and the white man 
will be able to travel anywhere without molestation.”78 Seymour, then, like Douglas, 
saw “civilizing” efforts such as missionary schooling as playing a role in the strategy 
of cultivating the goodwill of Indigenous peoples and strengthening colonial security.
Against this backdrop, Fouquet renewed his request for financial support from 
the colonial government. On August 24, 1865, he wrote to Seymour stating that 
because of:
the kind interest you have personally showed for the welfare of the Indians, I 
have the honor to state for the consideration of your Excellency that an average 
of fifty Indian boys have attended regularly the school at St. Mary’s during the 
last session with results as satisfactory as we could expect. A great many more 
Indian boys are seeking admission for the next session, but our limited means 
do not allow us to receive them. Your Excellency is aware that on account 
of their distant villages and for their better improvement and civilization the 
Indian boys are kept as boarders… I respectfully request that a portion of the 
public money… should be granted for the benefit of the children.79
On the back of the letter appears the following note: “Authorize a grant of £50 from 
the school fund for St. Mary’s Mission and School.”80 That the grant was approved is 
corroborated by a local official, Arthur Birch, who wrote to Fouquet: “I am directed 
by the Governor to acquaint you that he had been pleased to sanction a grant of £50 
in aid of the St. Mary’s school and mission [and I am] instructed to pay you the same 
on application.”81 Fouquet was thrilled. He explained, “This mark of interest on 
the part of the government will not only be an encouragement to us to continue to 
use our utmost endeavours to make the Indians under our care good Christians and 
good citizens, it will moreover be an inducement as well to the school boys, as to the 
Indians generally, to improve more and more their condition.”82
Upon receipt of the government grant for the boys of St. Mary’s, Fouquet made a 
similar request for a school for girls. He wrote to Birch, “we have established a school 
for girls at New Westminster under the direction of the Sisters of St Ann with two 
departments, one for white children and the other for half breed and Indian children. 
Although the average number of pupils in both departments did not exceed twenty 
two during the first year there are still good prospects of seeing it increased.”83 He 
suggested that “in consideration of the foregoing your memorialist asks that the gov-
ernment will grant some assistance to the school for the boys at St. Mary’s and the 
school for girls at New Westminster, even if the pecuniary assistance cannot be but 
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a small amount.”84 Later in the month, Fouquet responded to Henry Maynard Ball, 
magistrate for New Westminster, stating, “I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of your communication of the 25th inst. informing me that the sum of £250 has been 
appropriated towards the education of the Indian children in our schools of the New 
Westminster District and to thank the government for it.”85 In Fouquet’s report for 
1865–1866, he confirmed: “The grant we have received from the Government in 
August 1865 has enabled us to admit ten additional boys from amongst the numerous 
applicants who were most anxious to become partakers of a good education and thus 
we increased our number to an average of sixty boarders.”86 Included in Fouquet’s re-
port is rare documentation of a student voice in the form of an address made to Birch 
on a visit to St. Mary’s. The address was likely prepared, or at least approved, by a mis-
sion authority; however, it remains an important example of students acknowledging 
the funds the school received from the state: “We are most happy of having another 
opportunity of thanking you as the representative of Her Majesty as well for your kind 
visits and for the pecuniary assistance which we have already received and which shall 
always be remembered by us with feelings of the most sincere gratitude.”87
Seymour was pleased with the role that St. Mary’s was playing in cultivating 
the goodwill of Indigenous peoples in the colony. “Civilizing” Indigenous peoples 
through educational initiatives like St. Mary’s was viewed by the early state as support-
ing the larger strategy of containing Indigenous resistance to colonization and thus, 
ultimately, helping to strengthen colonial security. Given the financial constraints 
of the colony after the gold rush, Seymour, like Douglas before him, conceived of 
granting missionaries small sums of money and tracts of land as a cheaper alternative 
to outfitting colonial militias to try to quell Indigenous uprisings. By the late 1860s, 
the government viewed Catholic missionaries, and Christian missionaries generally, 
as providing an invaluable service to the colony that warranted state support.
Conclusion
Indigenous peoples and settlers engaged in innumerable conflicts in the colonies of 
Vancouver Island and British Columbia between 1849 and 1871. Given the great 
population imbalance that existed between Indigenous peoples and settlers through-
out the period, the threat of violent Indigenous resistance to colonization — both 
real and imagined — created feelings of anxiety for settlers and colonial officials, and 
these feelings shaped early state support for missionary schooling. Lacking a military 
force to effectively counteract organized Indigenous resistance to colonization, the 
nascent state hoped that missionaries could use education to cultivate the goodwill 
of Indigenous peoples and strengthen colonial security. Officially, the colonial state 
refused aid to religious bodies. Unofficially, however, the state supported missionaries 
in the form of land grants and cash payments and generally encouraged their efforts 
to create and run mission schools for Indigenous children.
State support for early educational initiatives concerning Indigenous peoples in 
colonial British Columbia was thus not an act of benevolence, nor one rooted in any 
great sense of religious duty. The state’s objective was for missionaries to act as buffers 
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between Indigenous peoples and settlers and to use their teachings to train the for-
mer to accept and accommodate themselves to the emerging capitalist settler society. 
Overall, the state supported early missionary schooling in various ways, as part of a 
strategy of trying to check the power of Indigenous peoples to strengthen colonial 
security and bolster British control in the Pacific Northwest.
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